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Abstract
Discounting Nordhaus
by Thomas R. Michl
JEL Q5, E6
Keywords: Global warming, Stern Review, Discounting, Ramsey
equation, Cambridge equation, Cambridge Theorem
This paper evaluates Nordhaus’s neoclassical complaints about the
Stern Review from the vantage point of classical growth theory. Nordhaus argues that the Stern Review exaggerates the effects of global
warming because it uses a discount rate that is well below the market
rate of return on capital. From the perspective of classical growth theory, Nordhaus’s belief in choosing preference parameters for the social
planner based on observed market rates of return filtered through the
Ramsey equation is equivalent to assigning the preferences of the capitalist agents to the social planner. This equivalence is an implication
of the Cambridge Theorem, which interprets the Ramsey equation as
the saving function of the capitalist agents. The classical theory of
growth interprets the market return to capital as a reflection of the
property relations of capitalist society that does not offer the social
planner any information that would be useful in resolving the problem
of global warming. Contrary to the viewpoint of neoclassical economic
theory, the market return to capital offers no information about preferences for the social welfare function or about the putative “marginal
product” of conventional capital.
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The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of
ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to
avoid being deceived by economists. —Joan Robinson
Nowhere is Joan Robinson’s gnomic observation more applicable than in
the debates about discounting spawned by the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2007). The back-to-back reviews of the Review
by William Nordhaus (2007) and Martin Weitzman (2007) display some potential confusion about the discount rate created by modern neoclassical economics. Since both reviewers (misleadingly, we will argue) adopt the voice
of a disinterested scientific observer, it is particularly important for noneconomists and students of economics who want to engage with this public
conversation to have an alternative account so that they can make up their
minds informed by the full pluralist range of economic theory.1
This paper provides an alternative viewpoint that is grounded in the classical economic tradition of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx as
it has been translated through modern figures like Nicholas Kaldor, Joan
Robinson, and Luigi Pasinetti. The classical growth model provides an alternative account of the return on capital that stands at the center of the
discounting debate. The paper assumes some familiarity with the terms of
modern economic discourse. While Weitzman agrees with most of the points
that Nordhaus raises about discounting, he focusses on the economics of
uncertainty. Therefore, we concentrate on Nordhaus’s claim that the Stern
Review ’s high estimates of the cost of global warming depend on its choice
of an indefensibly low discount rate.

1

The Ramsey and Cambridge equations

This debate centers around the Ramsey equation that connects growth to
the rate of return on capital (often called the rate of interest by neoclassical
economists and the rate of profit by classical economists). The Ramsey
equation can be seen as the solution to an optimization problem by a so-called
dynastic agent that lives forever. The idea of a dynastic agent was developed
after Ramsey; he viewed his equation as the solution to an optimization
1

For a broader discussion of the economics of global warming that is well informed
by the criticisms of neoclassical economy theory raised by heterodox or non-orthodox
economists, see Ackerman (2007).
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problem by a benevolent social planner trying to achieve a social optimum
for current and future generations. This is the standpoint of the Stern Review
and its critics, who are asking important questions about how such a planner
should behave, since this is thought to provide insight into what kind of
policies real decision-makers ought to pursue. But it is best to start with the
real economy and work back to the idealized planner.
Because discrete time is easier to visualize than continuous time, and in
order to be able to make direct comparisons with the discrete-time classical
growth models developed in Foley and Michl (1999) and Michl and Foley
(2004), we will work with discrete periods rather than continuous time. The
Stern Review and Nordhaus both operate in continuous time, and we provide
some notes translating between the two frames of reference. In discrete time,
C0 refers to consumption in period t = 0. All variables are dated like this,
but where the subscript refers to an arbitrary period, t, it is suppressed, and
where it refers to the next period, t + 1, it is shortened to +1.
The dynastic agent that lives forever is a synthetic individual, created
by observing that if each generation is altruistic in a particular way toward
their children, the whole dynasty will behave as if it were one infinitely-lived
dynastic individual. In this case we can write out its utility function for each
generation like this:
U=

C 1−α
1−α

This particular function is called a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) utility function because it can be demonstrated that the parameter
α is the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution between consumption (C)
now and one period from now (C+1 ). The Stern Review uses a function like
this to represent the world’s welfare, and sets α to unity. In this particular
case, the function reduces to the simpler U = ln C; this is sometimes described as the Cobb-Douglas form.2 But α can take any value greater than
or equal to zero. It is traditional to rule out a zero value based on the psychological law of diminishing marginal utility; α = 0 implies that utility is
a linear function of consumption so each additional unit of C produces one
more util of pleasure. Larger values of α represent more sharply diminishing
marginal utility.
2
The Cobb-Douglas production function has an elasticity of substitution between its
two inputs that is equal to one.
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The dynasty’s problem is to maximize this function over time, for the
current and future generations. Because each cohort or generation is altruistic toward its children, and because people have a psychological propensity
to prefer present consumption to future consumption, the dynasty discounts
(shrinks down) future consumption by a factor, β.3 Different authors use
different notation for this parameter, the pure time preference factor, and its
continuous time counterpart, the pure rate of time preference. The dynasty
chooses a consumption sequence that maximizes4
(1 − β)

∞
X

β t U (C)

t=0

The (1−β) term has been placed outside the summation for aesthetic reasons;
it simplifies the solution by letting β serve as both the pure time discount
factor and, as we will see below, the saving propensity out of wealth.
Pure time discounting shows up inside the summation. Utility generated
farther in the future counts less because it is discounted by a smaller fractional factor as t rises. For example, if β = .95, one util of pleasure generated
by consumption 100 years in the future will be worth only .0003 utils today.5
To anticipate, in evaluating the effects of global warming the Stern Review
uses a discount factor much closer to unity (equivalently, a discount rate near
zero), and this is Nordhaus’s complaint:
In fact, using the Review ’s methodology, more than half of the
estimated damages ‘now and forever’ occur after the year 2800.
The damage puzzle is resolved. The large damages from global
warming reflect large and speculative damages in the far-distant
3

If people prefer future consumption over present consumption (e.g., because a vacation
is more fun if you get to anticipate the experience), β might be greater than unity, but
almost all discussions presume that people are impatient.
4
For comparison with Nordhaus’s paper, note that in continuous time this would be an
integration problem, and the pure rate of time preference would be treated like an interest
rate in a present discounting formula:
Z ∞
U (C) exp((β − 1)t)
t=0

Here the discount factor, β, has been changed to a discount rate, (1 − β) that goes to zero
(no discounting) when β = 1.
5
That is (1 − .95)(.95)100 .
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future magnified into a large current value by a near-zero time
discount rate (Nordhaus, 2007, p. 696).
Since we are constructing a classical growth model, let us assume that
this dynasty is a class of capitalist agents surviving solely from its wealth
or capital, K, that receives a rate of return, r. What the capitalist agent
saves and invests becomes its wealth in the next period, K+1 , so its budget
constraint is simply K+1 + C = (1 + r)K. Both its wealth and consumption
grow by the factor (1+g) = K+1 /K = C+1 /C in a steady state. Given a rate
of return, the solution to this optimizing problem is the Ramsey equation in
discrete time:6
(1 + g) = (β(1 + r))(1/α)
The Ramsey equation lies as the center of the controversies about discounting, and we will return to it repeatedly.

1.1

Cobb Douglas utility and the Cambridge equation

In the special case where in case α = 1, the Ramsey equation simplifies to a
linear function:
(1 + g) = β(1 + r)
Here capitalists are saving a constant fraction of their end-of-period wealth
(i.e., including the profits it generates). This has been a staple assumption of
classical growth theorizing for over two centuries. A version of it is sometimes
called the Cambridge equation, because it is used by modern classical writers
associated with Cambridge University, such as Kaldor or Robinson. The
Stern Review ’s choice of Cobb-Douglas utility fortuitously aligns with this
essay’s theme.
To visualize the underlying economics in this case, we can easily derive
the approximation that r − g ≈ 1 − β. This illustrates that the amount that
each generation saves and passes along to the future depends on how much
6

You can solve this problem using the Lagrangian method outlined in Foley and Michl
(1999, ch. 5), together with the method of “guess and verify.” See the appendix for the
solution. For comparison with Nordhaus’s review, the Ramsey equation in continuous
time is g = (r − (1 − β))/α, where the discount factor, β, has been replaced by a discount
rate, (1 − β), that is deployed like an interest rate used to calculate present value.
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the future is discounted by pure time preference. Discounting penalizes the
dynasty for consuming in the future. In the extreme case where the future is
not discounted at all (β = 1), all profits are saved and the rate of profit and
the rate of growth will be equal because there is no penalty for consuming
in the future.

1.2

CES utility

If α 6= 1, the growth rate will be a non-linear, but still increasing, function
of the rate of profit. Most attention has been devoted to the case of α > 1,
in which case growth will be lower than in the case α = 1. The economic
intuition is that now there is an additional penalty to passing along wealth
to the future: future cohorts will have more wealth and consumption, and
with such a large α they will experience sharply diminishing marginal utility. There is an advantage here to “redistributing” consumption toward the
present generation because it is poorer than future generations. The term
“discounting” thus can refer to a pure rate of time preference or to the penalty
from diminishing marginal utility.
This property of α becomes significant when the CES utility function
is used as a social welfare function, because it measures the payoff from
redistributing income progressively. Large values of α imply a large payoff
from reducing the consumption of the rich in order to raise the consumption
of the poor.

2

Classical growth models

The simplest way to build a classical growth model is to include the dynastic
capitalist agent in a model with workers who do no saving at all and just
live hand-to-mouth. This is not as restrictive as it might seem. A more
realistic and satisfying assumption about worker saving would be the lifecycle hypothesis that workers save for their retirement. In this case, they
are not altruistic toward their children, and leave no bequests, so the class
structure reproduces itself over time. At any point in time, some workers
will be saving but others will be dissaving in retirement, and at the social
level it is clear that the net amount of worker saving depends on the ratio of
retirees (dissavers) to workers (savers). This ratio is basically the growth of
the labor force.
7

Without worker saving, it is clear that the Ramsey equation fully characterizes the relationship between the rates of profit and growth. But which
determines which? The traditional classical answer (i.e., going back to Ricardo or Marx) is that the rate of profit is determined by the distribution
of income and the technology, and both are exogenous to the accumulation
decision, at least up to a first approximation. The distribution of income
condenses down to the relation between the real wage and the productivity
of labor, and this is a remarkably stable structural feature of capitalist society. The profit share, π, and its complement, the wage share 1 − π, show
considerable stability, both across time and across countries. The relevant
technological variables are the ratio of output to capital stock (sometimes
called the productivity of capital), ρ, and the depreciation rate of capital, δ.
These also have been fairly stable. The rate of profit is by definition:
r = πρ − δ
Classical growth models that begin with this assumption are endogenous
growth models because the rate of growth is a free variable that depends on
capitalist saving behavior, technology, and the real wage. The underlying
assumption is that labor supply does not constrain growth because capitalist
economies are fundamentally labor-surplus systems. For example, there may
be demographic or structural features that release increased labor supplies in
response to the demands for workers generated by growth and accumulation.
In this case, the Ramsey equation reads causally from right to left: the rate
of profit determines the rate of growth.
At the other extreme, some modern classical growth models adopt the
standard neoclassical assumption that the labor force limits growth, which in
the long run at least takes place under conditions of full employment. (There
might be some unemployment, but if there is an equilibrium unemployment
rate, such as the natural rate or NAIRU theories predict, it amounts to the
same thing.) This assumption makes the rate of growth fully exogenous, and
the task of a growth model is to show how the distributional variables adjust
to whatever it happens to be. In this case, the Ramsey equation needs to be
rearranged to showcase the causal structure: the rate of growth determines
the rate of profit. Specializing the utility function to the Cobb-Douglas form,
the Cambridge equation written in its traditional form reads causally from
right to left:
(1 + g)
(1 + r) =
β
8

You might think that things would be more complicated if we introduced
worker saving for life-cycle reasons into this model. Wouldn’t worker saving
make the Ramsey equation insufficient as a description of the relationship
between profitability and growth?

2.1

The Cambridge Theorem

It turns out that the answer to that question is, surprisingly, no, at least in
the long run. This was discovered by Luigi Pasinetti (1962) in the context
of an exogenous growth model with α = 1. He called this result the Cambridge Theorem, and it says that given a rate of growth, the rate of profit is
determined by the Cambridge equation, independently of worker saving or
technology. It seems reasonable to extend this theorem to the more general
Ramsey equation.
The Cambridge Theorem applies to a two-class model (i.e., with worker
saving included) of endogenous growth as well; see Michl and Foley (2004)
for an example. In this case, it states that the rate of growth is determined
by capitalist saving behavior, independently of worker saving, given the rate
of profit.
In both these cases, the Cambridge Theorem describes the very long-run,
steady state equilibrium. Take the case of an endogenous growth model, for
example. An increase in worker saving in an endogenous growth model will
temporarily increase capital accumulation. But because workers have a lower
propensity to save than capitalists, the growth rate that would prevail if they
were the only agents in the model is lower than the growth rate generated
by capitalist saving (i.e., described by the Ramsey equation). It follows that
eventually the growth of capital owned by workers will return to the growth
rate established through the Ramsey equation. An increase in worker saving
will have an effect on the distribution of capital wealth (workers will own a
greater share), but not on its long-run growth rate.
Similar reasoning shows that in an exogenous growth model, an increase
in worker saving will have no effect on the rate of profit in the long run,
although it will lead to a higher share of capital being owned by workers. In
both the exogenous and endogenous growth models, the Cambridge Theorem
establishes that capitalists occupy a privileged position at the commanding
heights in the structure of accumulation.
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2.2

Interpreting the data

But what does all this have to do with global warming and discounting? We
can observe the rate of profit and the rate of growth in real economies such
as the US. The rate of return on capital lies somewhere in the range 7–15
percent per year, with 10 percent per year a fairly good estimate. The rate of
growth of capital ranges from 2.5–5 percent per year. Thus, a rough estimate
of 0.93–0.95 for β makes sense if the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. If it
is more generally CES, then a range of (β, α) is possible. We can, in other
words, indirectly observe the preferences of capitalist agents, assuming they
are behaving according to our model.
One complication is that other models could produce the same behavior,
characterized by the Ramsey or Cambridge equations. For example, if capitalist agents save for the sake of accumulating capital itself, either because
they want the “warm glow” of giving it to their heirs or because they want
the “warm glow” that comes from building up a fortune, that can lead to
the same Cambridge equation written above. (I provide some examples in a
forthcoming book (Michl, 2008) using a Cobb-Douglas utility function with
consumption and capital as arguments. In this case, the Cambridge equation tells us about the weight given to capital accumulated at the end of life
relative to consumption during life.)
If we want to recover the preference parameters of the worker agents,
we could use the observed distribution of wealth to generate estimates. In
our classical two-class model, their discount factor for future generations
would be zero since the life-cycle theory assumes no role for intergenerational
altruism.7

3

The social planner’s problem

All this matters because Nordhaus and others would like us to believe that the
Ramsey equation should be used by policy makers for guidance in selecting
a discount factor for measuring the costs of global warming. Here is where
we need to pay attention in order to avoid being deceived by economists.
The standard approach by economists to policy making in a growth setting is to ask how a benevolent social planner with absolute powers (i.e., a
7

Translated into continuous time terminology, their discount rate for future generations
would be infinity.
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benevolent dictator) would allocate resources over time. One answer8 assigns
the planner the task of maximizing the discounted utility of all current and
future generations, making no effort to distinguish between capitalist and
worker agents. Letting the lower-case c and u represent consumption and
utility for a homogeneous generation of people, the social welfare function
might be:
(1 − βp )

∞
X

βpt u(c)

t=0

where βp represents the pure rate of time preference used by the planner.
If we further assume that u(c) takes the CES form, with parameter αp , we
can see that this problem shares some structure with the capitalist agent’s
problem, and the Ramsey equation will appear in some form in its solution.
From the perspective of the classical growth models surveyed earlier, it
is clear that the social planner’s problem only makes sense in the exogenous growth model because it requires that the population whose welfare is
being optimized be well-defined. In the endogenous growth models, the population is itself endogenously determined by past accumulation, and is not
well-defined in this sense, since a different history of accumulation implies a
different population.
What separates the Stern Review from Nordhaus and its other critics
concerns what values to assign βp and αp . The Stern Review takes αp to be
unity; it works with the simpler Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function.
Its argument for this seems more pragmatic than principled.
On the other hand, the Stern Review takes the principled stance that βp
should be set (almost) equal to unity, implying virtually no discounting of
future generations at all. This stance reflects a straightforward and powerful
ethical position: people whose only crime is to be born in the future deserve
to be treated equally with those of us who walk the Earth in the present.9 It
is important to notice that Frank Ramsey (1928) himself advocated precisely
this position.
8

Nordhaus (2007) does provide a helpful discussion of other approaches, but he ultimately accepts this one.
9
Why not exactly 1? The Stern Review assigns a very small probability to a global
disaster like an asteroid that eliminates a large chunk of the human population, and uses
a discount factor slightly less than unity to accommodate this contingency. Note that to
accommodate a discount factor exactly 1 would require that we drop the (1 − βp ) term,
and it would create problems with infinities such as a utility sum that does not converge.
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Nordhaus (2007, p. 691) takes the position that the Stern Review is being
elitist in these choices:
The Review takes the lofty vantage point of the world social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers of the British Empire,
in determining the way the world should combat the dangers of
global warming. The world, according to Government House utilitarianism, should use the combination of time discounting and
consumption elasticity the Review’s authors find persuasive from
their ethical vantage point.
Fair enough. But what is Nordhaus’s ethical vantage point?
I have always found the government House approach misleading
in the context of global warming . . . Instead, I would interpret
the baseline trajectory, from a conceptual point of view, as one
that represents the outcome of market and policy factors as they
currently exist . . . This approach does not make a case for the
social desirability of the distribution of incomes over space or time
of existing conditions, any more than a marine biologist makes
a moral judgment on the equity of the eating habits of marine
organisms . . . (Nordhaus, 2007, pp. 691-92)
So Nordhaus asks us to regard him as a neutral observer, like a biologist.
His preferred strategy is to extract estimates of the key parameters that
match observations of real economies:
. . . in calibrating a growth model, the time discount rate and the
consumption elasticity [i.e., αp ] cannot be chosen independently if
the model is designed to match observable real interest rates and
saving rates. To match a real interest rate of, say, 4 percent and a
growth in per capita consumption of 1.3 percent per year requires
some combination of high time discounting and high consumption
elasticity.(Nordhaus, 2007, p. 694)
To illustrate the importance of matching real economies, Nordhaus provides a series of calibrated simulations from his DICE-2007 model of global
warming and capital accumulation. These simulations generate an optimal
12

carbon tax that measures the social cost of carbon. The social cost of carbon is the present value of the reduction in utility in the future caused by
emissions. Using the contested alternative discount rates, the simulations
reveal that the social cost of carbon reported by the Stern Review is an order of magnitude higher than the DICE baseline. But choosing a baseline
recalibrated to βp = 1 and αp chosen to match the observed market return
on capital generates a social cost of carbon that differs marginally from the
DICE baseline. Nordhaus (2007, p. 700) concludes that “the central difference between the Review and many other economic models lies in the implicit
real return on capital embedded in the model.”
But now Nordhaus is asking us to endorse the outcomes observed in
real economies. The social planner should adopt the preference parameters
extracted from market outcomes. Nordhaus is interpreting the world through
a particular theory of growth, the neoclassical theory, that suppresses or
ignores the class structure of accumulation. The theory assumes that the
Ramsey equation characterizes the behavior of one representative agent.
From the vantage point of the classical theory of growth, the Cambridge
Theorem explains that those parameters reflect the preferences of the capitalist agents who occupy the commanding heights of the structure of accumulation. In practice, it is difficult to identify who the capitalist agents are
in real economies, just as it is difficult to operationalize any economic category, even one as simple as “investment”. But a reasonable estimate might
identify the top 1 or 2 percent of households, ranked by wealth or income,
with the capitalist agents whose bequest saving dominates the accumulation
process in advanced capitalist economies.
Nordhaus’s position can now be seen as an evasion of some very difficult
political questions that simply adopts the preferences of the financial and economic elites and assigns them to the social planner. Because the capitalist
agents discount their own future generations (either from a pure preference
for present consumption, or from sharply diminishing marginal utility experienced by the richer cohorts of the future), so should policy makers who
presumably are charged with protecting the future of humanity. Stated in
this way, it is hard to see Nordhaus as a biologist studying the “eating habits
of marine organisms.”
We should not let Nordhaus confuse us with such phrases as “the Review ’s
radical revision of the economics of climate change.” Like his rhetorical use
of “House utilitarianism” in the quotations above, this tropism creates heat,
not light. In fact, the Stern Review takes a defensible position that traces
13

back to quite respectable origins; the eponymous Frank Ramsey is one of
the most significant figures in economics and mathematics in the twentieth
century.

4

Reevaluating the Stern Review

From the vantage point of the classical growth theory, the market rate of
return does not offer any information that would be of much use to a social
planner. The fact that the Stern Review ignores the market rate of return
in choosing a calibration for the social planner appears fit and proper. In
particular, it is hard to argue with Stern’s principled objection to applying
a pure rate of time preference that penalizes people for when they are born.
On the other hand, the Stern Review ’s decision to use a Cobb-Douglas
utility function appears somewhat arbitrary. However, here we can consult
the two-class growth model described above because it tells us how the overwhelming majority of people behave. Cobb-Douglas utility in a life-cycle setting implies that workers are saving out of their wage income for retirement.
A change in the return on saving–the rate of profit to a first approximation–
will not affect their saving rate out of wage income. In economic terms, with
a constant elasticity of substitution equal to unity, the substitution effect
(higher profit rate makes future consumption cheaper) is exactly offset by a
wealth effect (higher profit rate makes any saving worth more today). Many
if not most studies of saving behavior have indeed found that saving rates
are not particularly sensitive to real returns on saving (Bosworth and Burtless, 1992); this is a standard reason given in macroeconomics textbooks for
leaving the rate of return out of the consumption function. It follows that
the Cobb-Douglas form is a decent approximation to average behavior.
But should observed behavior be the benchmark for a social planner? We
have already rejected the idea that it should in the case of a pure rate of time
preference. One could, however, argue that the social planner would want
to use observed market behavior to determine how much utility (whatever
that is) is produced by the consumption of each generation. In this case,
the Stern Review ’s choice of a log utility function (with a near-one pure
time discounting factor) makes good sense as an approximation to average
behavior. Yet it is hard to avoid the feeling that this decision has been taken
faute de mieux, and that it serves the role of a placeholder until something
better comes along. Nordhaus sensibly complains that the Stern Review
14

fails to conduct a robustness analysis using a range of calibrations. Future
generations will probably be richer than we are, and perhaps more capable
of absorbing the costs of global warming.

5

Optimal growth for workers

Economists have studied the question of what distribution of income would be
optimal for workers who save for life-cycle purposes. Given a rate of growth
(i.e., in an exogenous growth model), the optimal allocation of consumption
over each typical worker’s life span will arise when the rate of profit equals the
rate of growth. That is called the golden rule. From the Cambridge equation,
(1 + g) = β(1 + r) we can see that this requires a capitalist discount factor of
unity. Through this perspective, the gap between the rate of profit and the
rate of growth measures how far market economies are from an allocation that
is optimal from the point of view of workers. If the social planner could force
the capitalist agents to abstain from consuming out of their wealth, each
generation of worker would be as well-off as possible, given the constraint
that society needs to maintain accumulation at a predetermined rate. This
vantage point contextualizes Nordhaus’s and others’ frequent complaints that
the Stern Review recommends an implausibly high saving rate in the present.

6

The marginal product of capital

There is one final, separate argument that Nordhaus makes about the market
rate of return: it measures the “marginal product” of conventional capital.
This is supposed to give the planner an indication of how much to invest in
“climate capital” such as emissions abatement. If the hurdle rate of return
to climate capital is set too low by the planner, it will result in an inefficient
program of overinvestment in climate capital and underinvestment in conventional capital. Nordhaus (2007, p. 695) objects to the Stern Review ’s use
of a low real rate of interest for precisely this reason: “The efficient strategy
has more investment in conventional capital at the beginning and can use
those additional resources to invest heavily in climate capital later on.”
This statement invites the question of the extent that it is predicated on
the assumption of a well-behaved neoclassical production function in which
more capital per worker has a well-defined, measurable relationship to output
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per worker. In particular, a marginal product from the addition of one unit of
capital is well-defined. This theory has long been known to be theoretically
unsupported; it lacks rigorous microeconomic foundations.10 Economists understand so little about the relationship between capital accumulation and
productivity that the only really defensible position for a social planner is
one of relative ignorance. We know that the productivity of capital has remained constant at large time scales (with some fairly sizeable shifts, but no
sustained trends) in advanced capitalist countries.11 We also know that the
productivity of labor has been increasing more or less steadily. We do not
know how variations in capital accumulation affect those paths. A prudent
planner would want to take the future course of technology as part of the
given conditions by projecting those trends, or even better a range of trends.
The idea that capital represents a technology for transferring resources from
the present to the future, like planting a tree that bears fruit in the future,
owes more to the quasi-theological discourse of marginalist economics than
to any scientific principle.
The social planner is interested in the technological structure of the problem of global warming, including the impact of research and development on
the productivities of labor and capital; the rate of profit does not in itself
provide any additional information that would help her out. Recall that the
rate of profit is the arithmetic product of the profit share and the productivity of capital. The market share of income going to the owners of capital
in the form of profit plays no role in the planner’s problem because it is not
part of its “primitives” or fundamental conditions.
Even if we take the well-behaved production function to be merely a
useful “parable” (a defense often offered by more sophisticated neoclassical
theorists), the role of technical choice is arguably subsidiary to the distribution of income in a classical growth model. Once the rate of return on capital
has been determined by the Cambridge equation, the production function is
relevant only for determining which technique has a marginal product equal
to the rate of profit. (This is why neoclassical economists sometimes call
the Cambridge Theorem the “Pasinetti Paradox,” since it effectively moots
10

For elaboration of this point, see Cohen and Harcourt (2003).
There have been many episodes of declining capital productivity, and these do create
the impression of movement along a putative production function, which Foley and Michl
(1999) and Michl (1999) call a fossil production function. However, the rate of profit almost
universally exceeds the apparent marginal product of capital during these episodes, and
does not convey any information about the technological frontier. See also Michl (2008).
11
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the marginal productivity theory of distribution.) From the classical perspective, the debate over the production function remains secondary to the
debate over the Ramsey/Cambridge equation rehearsed above.

7

Summing up

Why does all this matter? Nordhaus and other critics of the Stern Review
advocate a climate-policy ramp that calls on policy makers to take modest
steps toward emission reduction today, postponing the really heavy investment in abatement for the distant future. That could be (we are not trying
to resolve this question here!) the wrong thing to do if the Stern Review ’s
estimates of the costs of global warming are accurate. We began with a quip
from Joan Robinson, and we end with a modified version of another that is
sometimes attributed to her: economics is too important to be left to the
(neoclassical) economists.
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8

Appendix: Deriving the Ramsey equation

Since I could not find any textbook derivation (or even presentation) of the
Ramsey equation in discrete time using the CES form utility function, here
is a derivation using the Lagrangian method that students and others might
find useful.
The problem is to choose the sequence {C}∞
0 to
max (1 − β)

∞
X

β t C 1−α /(1 − α)

t=0

subject to C + K+1 ≤ (1 + r)K
given K0 , r
The first line is the objective function. The second line is the budget
constraint. Treated as an equality, as it should be since throwing away wealth
is not rational, this immediately tells us something about the rate of growth
and the rate of profit. Taking t = 0 as a representative period, we have
K1 = K0 (1 + g) = (1 + r)K0 − C0
which implies that
C0 = (r − g)K0
On a steady state, where both C and K grow at the same constant rate,
the consumption-wealth ratio will be the difference, r − g. We will use this
insight below.
To solve this problem, first write the Lagrangian, which consists of the objective function minus the penalty function, with λ representing the penalty
for violating the budget constraint, called the shadow price of capital by
economists and the Lagrangian multiplier by mathematicians.
L = (1 − β)

∞
X

β t C 1−α /(1 − α) − λ(C + K+1 − (1 + r)K)

t=0

Then obtain the first-order conditions that characterize a saddlepoint
solution:
∂L/∂C =

(1 − β)β t
−λ≤0
Cα
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(1)

∂L/∂K+1 = λ − λ+1 (1 + r) ≤ 0

(2)

∂L/∂λ = C + K+1 − (1 + r)K ≥ 0

(3)

From equation (1), evaluated at t = 0, we have:
C0α =

1−β
λ0

Since we know that the penalty function will be zero from the saddlepoint
property, we can write:
∞
X

λC =

∞
X

0

(λ − λ+1 (1 + r))K+1 + λ0 (1 + r)K0

0

Now use equation (2), which will be satisfied as an equality because capital
will never go to zero (it always provides some utility in future), to eliminate
the first term on the RHS of this equation; and use equation (1) to replace
the LHS with
∞
X

λC = (1 − β)

∞
X

β t C 1−α

0

0

which gives us
t 1−α
(1 − β) ∞
0 β C
λ0 =
(1 + r)K0

P

Substituting into the equation for C0 above,
(1 + r)K0
C0α = P∞ t 1−α
0 β C
The denominator of this expression can be expanded:
∞
X

β t C 1−α = C01−α +

0

∞
X

β t C 1−α

1

Then the expression simplifies to
C0 = (1 + r)K0 − C0α

∞
X
1
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β t C 1−α

To resolve the summation on the RHS, we “guess” that the solution is
a steady state, with C and K both growing at the same rate, g. Thus,
Ct = C0 (1 + g)t can be used to clean up the summation:
C0 = (1 + r)K0 − C0

∞
X

β t (1 + g)t(1−α)

1

Solving for C0 :
C0 =

1+

(1 + r)K0
= (1 − β(1 + g)1−α )(1 + r)K0
t (1 + g)t(1−α)
β
1

P∞

This reads like a consumption function: consume a constant fraction of
end-of-period wealth. Note that with Cobb-Douglas utility (α = 1), that
fraction does not depend on the rate of accumulation, and we can go back to
the budget constraint to derive g immediately. Otherwise we use our guessed
steady state, which implies as we saw above that C0 = (r − g)K0 , to derive
the Ramsey equation:
(1 + g) = (β(1 + r))1/α
Since every period is like the first, this equation can be generalized to
describe the whole optimal program, verifying that our postulated solution
solves the original problem.
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